

**HISTORY OF TERRORISM:
PART X**

**MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD
IN IRAN**

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As you have been witnessing in the previous articles in this magazine, really Part IV of the Muslim Brotherhood continues with Part V, which includes the Muslim Brotherhood in America. But, before we get to that we have to gradually come up and close to the dismal event of 1978, which eventually led to the pseudo revolution of 1979. I will explain later why I call this a pseudo revolution. However, let's begin with August of 1978.

Trouble had been brewing in Iran for almost a year in August 1978 with visible revolts beginning in January 1978 after President Carter's New Year's praise of Iran as an "island of stability." The situation had started deteriorating a year earlier when the Shah had changed prime ministers, replacing Prime Minister Abbas Amir Hoveyda with Jamshid Amouzegar. The chief impact of the Amouzegar appointment was to decelerate Iran's development push, orienting investment toward agriculture and away from industry and high technology sectors.

Amouzegar had also adopted a curious position vis-à-vis the clergy, carrying out actions that superficially seemed to be aimed against the mullahs, but that seemed only to exacerbate the campaign against the government. Amouzegar had unilaterally suspended payments the regime had been making to the clergy, causing the first signs of unrest in the mosques. All timed provocations — including insulting letters against the clergy published in the Iranian press by information ministry officials and in May 1978, a police raid on the home of Iran's leading clergyman, Ayatollah Shariatmadari — fueled the discontent.

The Shah seemed almost oblivious to the simmering volcano beneath him and he continued to place his trust entirely in the SAVAK and the security services. That was his biggest mistake. The man in charge of SAVAK's day-to-day affairs was General Hossein Fardoust, a childhood friend of the Shah who had attended the Le Rosey School in Switzerland with him in the 1930s. According to information now available, Fardoust was likely the ringleader of the "inside track" or the revolution; for at least a full year before February 1979 he was carefully exploring for allies among the commanders of the armed forces and the intelligence services. Fardoust would sound out whether a particular officer, perhaps with longstanding grudges against the Shah, would agree to join the Islamic revolution. "The Americans have decided to get rid of the Shah," Fardoust would say. "We have to save ourselves. Will you join us?" Many did.

Both the Shah and his sister Princess Ashraf have said that they consider General Fardoust to have been a traitor to the regime. In her book, *Faces in a Mirror*, Ashraf said that after the suspension of subsidies to the clergy, the mosques became the scene of often-violent anti-Shah demonstrations. But she said "Curiously, SAVAK,

the Shah's secret police — the supposedly all-seeing, all-knowing intelligence source — made no reports on the extent and manner in which the mullahs were now using the sanctity of the pulpit to undermine the throne... Fardoust functioned as a kind of conduit for vital information on the highest level, which he delivered to my brother... I am convinced Fardoust must have withheld vital information from the Shah and was, in fact, in active negotiations with Khomeini during the last years of the regime."

Afterwards, Fardoust is rumored to be one of the leaders of Khomeini's SAVAMA; his home was linked to the December 1979 murder of Prince Shafiq in Paris. Concerning that charge, the Shah told an interviewer after the murder, "In my inner heart I hope it's not true. Because it would be so... I mean dirty, so vile, so disgusting." But in the months leading to February 1979, Fardoust enjoyed the monarch's wholehearted trust.

In early August 1978, Iran was ripped by the worst act of terrorism in history. After a week of scattered violence, over 400 people died on August 19th when a fire raged through the Rex Cinema in Abadan. The fire, it was clear, had been deliberately set and the doors to the theater barricaded from the outside to prevent any escape from the inferno. Amid mounting tension in Iran and charges of SAVAK involvement in setting the fire, the official Pars News Service began its own campaign. "There are two forces responsible for manipulating the current outbreaks — a mass of common naïve people who have been subjected to systematic brainwashing are being manipulated by both religious fanaticism and the landed classes," said Pars on August 18th. The rioters and terrorists "are encouraged by certain foreign elements which are hostile to the development of Iran," the news service charged. The atrocity of SAVAK did not help either.

For several weeks already, the Iranian press had been growing increasingly hostile to the British and in street discussions most Iranians admitted that the movement led by Khomeini and the mullahs was organized by London. Special attacks were reserved for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), whose Persian language broadcasts into Iran fanned the flames of revolt. In late July, the Iranian Workers Organization issued what amounted to an officially sanctioned attack on the BBC: "The BBC has been insulting and criticizing the Iranian nation in its Persian broadcasting services.... Iranian development and progress is like a thorn in the eyes of the British imperialists."

So widespread were attacks on the British in Iran that the press in London was compelled to take notice of it. In the August 21st *London Times* former British intelligence officer Lord Chalfont noted with characteristic British understatement: "There are, in Tehran, so many explanations for the current unrest. One school of thought advances the curious proposition of a British conspiracy; however, it turns out, on closer investigation, that no one can provide any evidence or even logical justification for this bizarre theory." Lord Chalfont added that the "Iranian government has traced some of the money back to numbered bank accounts in Switzerland. Here, predictably, the trail goes cold."

The Shiite clergy-led rebellion was also fed by the daily influx of hundreds of thousands of desperate displaced peasants into Iran's major cities. The migration from the countryside was the fruit of the economic policies of the Amouzegar government, which by halting many construction and development projects, created instant unemployment among the country's semi-skilled and unskilled labor force. Arriving in the cities, these peasants were shunted right into the mob violence that was gaining new strength with every new action. The rabble-rousers of the revolution were

the mullahs in the mosques. Inviolable to police and law enforcement authorities, the mosques became rallying points. Speeches by the leading ayatollahs, repeated in hundreds of other speeches throughout the country, whipped up the semiliterate people of Iran to frenzy, at the end of which they would swarm out onto the streets, chanting and singing praises of the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini.

It was not a political revolution, but a process of cult building, of conditioning the fearful and desperate emotions of Iran's backward peasants into a political battering ram of self-destruction. It was the mass suicide of the Reverend Jim Jones' Peoples Temple on a national scale. When a group of fanatic marcher, often drugged with opium and told by the mullahs that by dying they would be saved (martyrdom is a centuries-old tradition in Shiism), charged into the gun barrels of poorly trained police, their deaths only triggered further marches. Then as is the custom among Shiites, on the fortieth day after any death, new ceremonial marches were staged in memory of the dead. The result was new casualties. This forty-day cycle, which began in the spring of 1978, was to repeat itself with quickening intensity throughout the year. Finally, in the first week of September 1978, after several days of demonstrations bringing millions of Iranians into the street, the Shah acceded to pressure from his generals and declared martial law. That martial law had not been declared many months earlier can be ascribed to one factor only: the clamorous pressure of Amnesty International's "human rights" campaign. Not that the Shah was worried about only Amnesty and its allies; the American and British ambassadors in Tehran quietly had been warning that if the Shah declared martial law, his standing in world opinion would plummet sharply. By hesitating so long in taking a tough stand against the lunatics of the Shiite clergy, the Shah had given them enough rope to begin the cycle of demonstrations and death marches. Now by declaring martial law, he was not only confronting his own countrymen but the U.S. administration and the British. The showdown had begun.

On Friday, September 8th, the Shah named General Gholam Ali Oveissi as administrator of martial law. Formerly the commander of the Imperial Guard, the Shah's elite force, Oveissi had a reputation as a hawk. For some reason, the declaration of martial law, though broadcast on the radio, was not heard by many people. Later that day a clash developed between police and demonstrators who had not been told by their leaders that martial law had banned all manifestations. Up to 500 demonstrators were killed in what became known as "Black Friday." The Shah had thrown down the gauntlet: there was no turning back now. Although he would still seek compromise, compromise was no longer an option and his hesitation would cost him dearly.

The day after the massacre, the word was out that the White House had decided to get rid of the Shah. French columnist Paul Marie de la Gorce reported: "It was clear, over the last several days, that the calculations of the Shah aiming to reconcile the moderate elements of the Shiite clergy was in the process of failure. From all evidence, the Shah could not wait any longer to impose martial law. He knew very well that his removal was already being discussed, including among his longtime allies — the Americans.... There were other solutions being prepared in other Washington circles."

From outside Iran, two institutions in particular aided the on-the-ground war against the Shah: British Petroleum and the British Broadcasting Corporation. It has gone unnoticed that during the entire year of 1978, negotiations were proceeding between the government of Iran and the oil consortium represented by British Petroleum. Talks on renewing the 25-year con-

tract that began in 1953 after the Anglo-American intelligence coup d'etat that restored the Shah to the throne, had started in January 1978, and continued throughout the rest of the year. By October, they collapsed. Iranians on the inside of the negotiations say that the British were blackmailing Iran during the years preceding the contract's end by refusing to honor an agreement to buy most of Iran's oil production. Although BP and its allies had the authority to purchase up to 8 million barrels of oil per day from Iran by 1978, and had agreed to a minimum of 5 million, they were contracting for only 3 to 4 million. This forced Iran to adjust its income expectations and try to market the oil independently, which they had been doing successfully.

In October 1978, at the height of the revolution, the Shah and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) were negotiating the economic future of Iran, BP rejected NIOC's demands out of hand, refusing to promise to buy Iranian oil but demanding the exclusive right to buy that oil should it wish to in the future! The Shah and NIOC flatly rejected BP's final offer and it appeared that if the Shah overcame the revolt, then Iran would be totally free in its oil sales policy in 1979, able to market its own oil to the state companies of France, Spain, Brazil and many other countries on a state-to-state basis. "If the consortium (BP) is not willing to show more flexibility in its dealings, perhaps it is time for Iran to reconsider its overall relationship with the companies," declared an editorial in Iran's *Kayhan International* in September. In retrospect, the 25-year partnership with the consortium and the 50-year relationship with British Petroleum which preceded it have not been satisfactory ones for Iran.... Looking to the future, NIOC should plan to handle all operations by itself... while this would shift investment obligations wholly onto the NIOC it would simultaneously have the attraction of placing the profitable marketing of all the country's oil products into the hands of the state-owned company. The question on the minds of the oil industry executives here is: has the time for change finally come? Almost simultaneously, the first signs of worker unrest began in the Iranian oil fields. Iranian oil output was slowed, several times during 1978, to a trickle. In the middle of the Iran-BP negotiations, Iran's chief asset — its enormous oil wealth — was suddenly eliminated as a chip for bargaining. Iran's oil workers, according to reports, were organized primarily by a team of radicals sent into Khuzestan by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.

In the American press, not a single line was published about the Iranian fight with BP during the entire revolutionary period. Simultaneously, capital began leaving the country — a flight organized through BP channels among Iran's financial elite. This elite, represented primarily in certain Baha'i cult, Jewish and other bankers and merchants, had family connections to the British merchants and BP dating back to the 19th century. On the lower levels, this alliance rested on the historic agreements between the Shiite leadership and the underworld of the bazaar merchants. Dependent on financing at high rates of interest, the *bazaaris* had struck political and economic deals of convenience with the merchant banks. The *bazaaris* were traditionally connected to the unregulated monetary flows and smuggling within the Arab littoral states in the Persian Gulf. Exerting tremendous power over this uncontrolled financial nexus are a number of prominent and financially powerful Jewish families. Known as the "Jewish rug merchants," these financial concerns have the ability to exert an impact on Iran's economy through massive capital flight amounting to tens of millions of dollars within hours. The *New York Post* reported in October 1978 that in that month alone over \$700 million left Iran through channels controlled by

the Iranian Jewish community. None of this could have occurred without a green light from the British, whose intelligence service watches the goings on in the Persian Gulf markets with extreme care. For two centuries the British have controlled the smuggling and drug trade in the Gulf as a way station between Asia's Far East Golden Triangle and the West. Through these channels, vast amounts of arms and ammunition were smuggled into Iran to feed the rebellion — and money was smuggled out. It was in this period, between late September and the beginning of November, that the Shah missed his last real opportunity to stem the tide. By October, the Iranian nation was well aware that the British sponsored clergy was determined to bring down the regime. It was the talk of Tehran. Had the Shah taken the decision to confront the British openly and directly, he could have defeated them. That strategy would have centered around the Shah's launching his *own* revolution, by declaring that the security of Iran was threatened by a British imperialist conspiracy and by British Petroleum. He would have been able to paint the clergy as "black reactionaries" in the service of London and rallied most of Iran's political elite to his side. As it was, his poor political administration had propelled many of the middle class and intellectuals to the side of the fanatic Khomeini in the hope of latching their fortunes onto the mullahs' revolution.

In the international domain conditions were ripe for the Shah to pull a political coup against the British. If he had suddenly decided to nationalize BP and the rest of the consortium and market all of Iranian oil independently, breaking the expiring agreement, there were signs that France, West Germany and Japan would have ignored any British calls for a boycott (as happened in 1951, under Mossadegh) and reached state-to-state deals with Iran. The Soviet Union and its allies were also prepared to support the Shah against Khomeini. In late October, the Shah had received birthday telegrams from Leonid I. Brezhnev of the Soviet Union and many Eastern European leaders. Brezhnev's message had called for an expansion of relations between the Soviet Union and its neighbor, economically and politically. In 1978, a Tass release from Moscow urgently denied reports from Anglo-American sources that Moscow was behind the unrest in Iran and declared, "In order to uncover the reasons for the present disturbances in Iran, the CIA Directory would have to look particularly at the policy of his own country." Tass called charges by CIA Director Stansfield Turner about a Soviet role in fomenting unrest in Iran a "propagandistic cover-up for the American secret services in Tehran." Neighboring Iraq, which had watched Khomeini's opposition to the Shah carefully, took action on September 27th. The ayatollah was placed under arrest in Najaf, the Iraq holy city. Not only Iraq, but many Arab states were prepared to support the Shah against the clergy whose revolution they feared would later spread into the Arab world. But the Shah did not act.

Without the British Broadcasting Corporation, there would have been no Khomeini. During the entire year of 1978, the BBC stationed dozens of correspondents throughout the country, in every remote town and village. BBC correspondents, often part-time stringers for Khomeini, sometimes full-time British nationals in the employ of the British secret service, worked as the intelligence service for the revolution. As soon as a small incident occurred in some village, the BBC correspondent on the scene would relay the news to BBC headquarters in Tehran. Within hours, the BBC Persian language broadcasts would beam exaggerated accounts of the incident to all Iran! Functioning as the national loudspeaker for the mullahs and their sympathizers, each day the BBC would beam into Iran gory accounts of alleged atrocities committed by

the Iranian police — often without checking the veracity of the report. The Iranian government was never given a chance to rebut. Propagandists like Ibrahim Yazdi were given hours of airtime to vent their spleen against the Shah, all of which was eagerly listened to by the Shah's enemies in Iran. By late fall, the BBC was broadcasting the long, ranting speeches of the Ayatollah Khomeini himself — in their entirety. Several times during November and December, the Shah said he would take reprisal against London if the BBC's subversion was not halted. Once he threatened to break diplomatic relations with Great Britain. But the British government solemnly swore it had no influence over the BBC, which, they claimed was a "private corporation." At least twice the Shah summoned the British ambassador in Tehran to protest the actions of the BBC, but to no avail. From time to time, the government would expel a BBC correspondent, but no more.

Not until November 30, 1978, did a member of the Iranian Parliament, Hossein Daneshi from Abadan, demand to know why the BBC had been permitted to play its provocateur role: "A glance at the events and developments throughout the world over the past year demonstrates a diabolical plan aimed at the disintegration of Iran.... You should not be surprised if you see that the BBC prepares programs and, during its three programs in Persian, thinks of nothing but to make provocations, create disturbances and chaos. This old fox Britain, no longer able to secure good for itself, is looking for a prey. "My question for the government is this," declared Daneshi. "Why does it not clarify political facts and why does it not inform the people about political developments in the world which have been launched against Iran? Why does the government not unveil Britain's design as it is still tasting the fruits of its plundering?"

Why indeed? With the gathering storm, the BBC became the de facto coordinator for revolution. On less than 24 hours notice Tehran's mullahs could organize simultaneous demonstrations in Iranian cities separated by a thousand miles — through the BBC. In Paris, Khomeini made tapes ordering his cult followers to rampage through the streets. Within hours, his precise instructions, in his own voice in Persian, would be broadcast into Iran from BBC's London headquarters. Belying its origins as an arm of the British Special Operations Executive, the BBC began to broadcast war rumors in December, such as reports claiming that the Shah had fled the country, or had abdicated the throne to his son, or had gone insane. In December the Iranian Information Minister Tehrani accused the BBC of inciting the Iranian oil workers to strike. A BBC United Press International correspondent was expelled for reporting that the Shah had been assassinated. For a brief time that month, the *Washington Post* reported that the BBC was considered to be Iran's "Public Enemy No. 1," the military government of Prime Minister General Gholam Reza Ashari jammed the BBC broadcasts. It was too late.

The Shah's enemies in the clergy were not averse to a little psychological warfare of their own. Once, during a scheduled demonstration in Tehran on December 2, 1978, when the violence that antigovernment fanatics hoped for did not materialize, the Shiite clergy brought professionally made tape recordings of screams, gunshots and violence and played them over loudspeakers from the minarets of the mosques! Within hours, BBC correspondents in "on the scene" newscasts had their accounts of December 2nd demonstrations beaming into Iran, complete with background noise courtesy of the mullahs' electronic equipment. The next day, people emerging from their homes found red stains on the pavement where the march had taken place; the mullahs had poured red colored dye on the streets to

simulate blood. Tactics like this, everyone knew, so highly effective with Iran's population, were not devised by illiterate mullahs.

By this time, in Washington, the final go ahead had been given to replace the Shah with the Ayatollah. In November, the Carter administration announced that it had appointed George Ball of the Trilateral Commission and the Bilderberg Society to head a special NSC task force on Iran and the Persian Gulf. Ball, who had long been known as an anti-Shah advocate of the human rights mafia's views, delivered the obituary-in-advance for the Pahlavi regime, recommending that the United States drop its support of the Shah and make contacts with the opposition.

In early January 1979, at a meeting of the heads of state of the United States, Great Britain, France and West Germany in Guadeloupe, the U.S. administration formally announced to its allies that it would no longer work to keep the Shah in power. With the "Islamic card" now on the table, it was only a matter of time before the Shah was ousted. The brain behind Carter's decision was the one and only Zbigniew Brzezinski. This individual was recruited by the MI6 during WWII. He was the head of the Polish Resistance against the Nazis. There will be more about him in future articles.

Reflecting on the process of events that destroyed his regime, the Shah of Iran wrote later in his memoirs, *Answer to History*: "I did not know it then — perhaps I did not want to know — but it is clear to me now that the Americans wanted me out. Certainly this is what the human rights advocates in the State Department wanted and Secretary Vance apparently acceded. I say apparently because I was never told anything: nothing about the split in the Carter administration over Iran policy; nothing about the hopes some American officials put in the viability of an 'Islamic Republic' as a bulwark against communist incursions. What was I to make, for example, or the administration's sudden decision to call former Under Secretary of State George Ball to the White House as an adviser on Iran? I knew that Ball was no friend and I understood that he was working on a special report concerning Iran. No one ever informed me what areas the report was to cover, let alone its conclusions. I read them months later in exile and found my worst fears confirmed. Ball was among those Americans who wanted to abandon me and ultimately my country."

At this point, France's role became crucial. The French and the West Germans were well aware that a Khomeini regime would seriously destabilize the Persian Gulf and threaten their oil supply. They also knew that, using Khomeini as an excuse, the U.S. military would begin pressing for an expanded presence in the Indian Ocean area, which could upset the balance of world strategic forces and, in the opinion of Paris and Bonn, lead to WWII. Khomeini, in the French view, was a highly unstable card to play, one that could trigger the disintegration of the entire Middle East. France had already made one blunder that President Giscard d'Estaing must have regretted. When Iraq placed the Ayatollah under arrest in Najaf, the French inexplicably granted Khomeini asylum in France. Reportedly, the French decision was taken under the advice of the Shah, who told Giscard that Paris might better be able to control Khomeini's actions if he were located nearby rather than in some Arab country like Libya. For whatever reason, partly self-serving, the French government allowed Khomeini to arrive and he took up residence at Neauphle-le-Chateau near Paris. The Ayatollah became an overnight world celebrity — this was in October 1978 — and gave daily interviews to the international press. The French had not calculated on the effect of the electronic media. A steady stream of American and British agents filed through Khomeini's chateau to make the final arrangements for the transfer of power to the ayatollah. Among

Khomeini's guests were Ramsey Clark, the former U.S. attorney general; Joseph Malone, an ex-CIA station chief in Beirut with close ties to British intelligence; Zygmunt Nagorski, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and many more. The Anglo-American scenario for disintegrating the Middle East looked unstoppable. But the French and their allies sought the last chance. On January 6th, the Shah had named Shahpour Bakhtiar, a respected member of the National Front, as prime minister. The Bakhtiar government was the last hope of averting chaos in Iran. Dr. Bakhtiar himself had close ties to France and was held in high esteem among Iranian nationalists. He had been jailed under the Shah for his role among the democratic opposition, but he had no connections to a reactionary clergy. During WWII, he fought in the Free French armed forces against the Nazis and his son was a serving member of the French intelligence service. It was now Bakhtiar's responsibility to organize a national consensus around sanity to prevent power from slipping into the hands of the Dark Ages mullahs. No one could consider him a puppet of the Shah; if he could pull together a government, then perhaps Khomeini could be stopped. The French and their continental West European allies were willing to help.

"When, in 1940, Charles de Gaulle climbed into his modest plane to go to London, he was not convinced of success either," declared Bakhtiar in an interview just after he formed his cabinet. Some 2 weeks earlier, Bakhtiar had joined forces with Darious Farouhar, another member of the National Front, the main non-clergy opposition group that had been founded by Mohammed Moossadegh in the 1940s. Farouhar was called upon to back the effort of Prime Minister Siddighi to form a cabinet in late January. That effort failed and so Bakhtiar took the mantle. On January 3rd, in the United States,

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Lyndon LaRouche urged the world's governments to throw all of their support behind Bakhtiar's effort to form a constitutional government. In the 5 weeks that Bakhtiar served as prime minister, he displayed enormous courage and resolve to prevent Iran from falling into the Khomeini abyss. For his efforts, he was "expelled" from the National Front by its chairman, Karim Sanjabi, an opportunistic fool who decided early on that Bakhtiar could not succeed and instead traveled to Paris where he signed a pact with Khomeini. (For his reward, Sanjabi later served briefly as Khomeini's first foreign minister, until he was forced out of office and replaced by Yazdi.) Bakhtiar laughed at Sanjabi's mistakes, urging him to come back into the fold and break with Khomeini. "If Karim Sanjabi, who has just excluded me in a somewhat ridiculous fashion from the National Front, accepts the post as president of the regency council, the place awaits him." But Sanjabi would not accept.

Bakhtiar also sought an agreement with the Shah concerning control of the armed forces. Reluctant to give Bakhtiar full military control, the Shah demanded to retain the figurehead title of commander-in-chief. To strengthen his position with the armed forces, Bakhtiar asked General Fereidoun Djam, a former chief of staff who had had a falling out with the Shah years earlier, to return to Iran as his defense minister. Djam was highly respected by the armed forces and would help Bakhtiar rally their support. As soon as his government was ratified by the parliament, Bakhtiar began pushing through a series of major reform acts. Among them, he completely nationalized all British oil interests and concessions in Iran; put an end to martial law; abolished the secret police, SAVAK; pulled Iran out of the Central Treaty Organization and declared that Iran would no longer be "the gendarme of the Gulf." He also announced that he was removing Ardeshir Zahedi from his position as Iran's ambassador to the United States.

The Zahedi story is curious. Although Zahedi was assigned to Washington as the Shah's envoy, for the last several months before the revolution he had returned to Tehran, where he could be found at the Shah's constant side. Many, including Iran's former ambassador to the United Nations, Fereidoun Hoveyda, have hinted that Zahedi was part of the Khomeini conspiracy and was using his position to misinform the Shah. Whether the Shah trusted him is unclear; what is certain is that every day and sometimes twice a day, Zahedi would speak by telephone with Zbigniew Brzezinski in Washington. Through Zahedi came Brzezinski's marching orders for the besieged monarch.

David Aaron, Brzezinski's closest aide, was meanwhile putting together an Iran Task Force that included close consultation with the pro-Khomeini "Iran experts" such as Marvin Zonis, Richard Cottam, James Bill and so forth. Aaron also served as liaison with the State Department's Warren Christopher and with Ramsey Clark, Christopher's former boss. Bakhtiar faced two sorts of opposition. On the one hand, the clergy and the radical leftist backers of the Khomeini forces were constantly agitating against Bakhtiar; on the other hand, the conservative military, which was absolutely loyal to the Shah, was threatening a military coup against Bakhtiar in support of the Shah. The generals, politically naïve and unable to believe that the United States government was supporting Khomeini, steadfastly waited for orders from the Shah and "the Americans" to make a coup — orders that never came. Others waited to move with Khomeini. Bakhtiar was conducting round-the-clock negotiations to find a workable coalition to support his regime and until the last minute, there were chances he might succeed. The respected Ayatollah Shareatmadari showed signs that he and his several million followers were prepared to support

Bakhtiar as a transition government and some members of the National Front also agreed, as did an increasing number of military men. "If the priests take over Iran, then Iran will be in the Dark Ages," said Bakhtiar. I am not going to accept the disintegration of this country. I will be pitiless with everyone who threatens the unity and integrity of Iran. If I can have a few weeks — say, 2 months — of relative calm I can start up industrial production and make a new deal with all the strikers," he declared. "If Khomeini asks me to resign, then what I have to say to him is: *merde!*" he said defiantly. But already his coalition had begun to collapse. General Djam, his defense minister, refused the post and returned to London in the belief that Bakhtiar's effort was doomed. Other ministers, including his minister of justice resigned. In Paris, Khomeini refused all cooperation with the Bakhtiar government and demanded mass demonstrations against Bakhtiar in the streets. Chaos was spreading. In opposition to almost everyone's advice, Khomeini flew back to Iran on February 1st to a tumultuous welcome organized by his followers. Within hours, he proclaimed Bakhtiar's government illegal and proclaimed his own government of mullahs and advisers Yazdi, Ghotbzadeh et al.

Just before Khomeini's return to Iran, a visitor arrived in Tehran to take part in the anti-American demonstrations: Ramsey Clark. Marching under banners that read "Death to America!" the Carter administration's special envoy Clark declared his full support for Khomeini. From Tehran, he flew to Paris where he met the Ayatollah. After their talk, Clark emerged to make an astonishing declaration in American history: "The Ayatollah Khomeini and I hope that the American people and President Carter will respect our wishes and that the United States will not interfere through the Army, through American advisers, the CIA, or through support for Bakhtiar and let the nation determine its own fate." By February 9th, a little more than a week after Khomeini's entry into Tehran, Bakhtiar and nearly succeeded in establishing an accord with Mehdi Bazargan, the head of the Khomeini provisional government. A relative moderate, though a man with strong ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, Bazargan had reached a tentative accord with Bakhtiar to halt the revolt and create some sort of government of national unity. That same day, however, the first organized, armed insurrection in Iran began at an air force base outside Tehran. All of a sudden, a huge arms depot was seized by a clique of air force technicians. Tens of thousands of automatic weapons were handed out to a frenzied crowd. Fearing the rebellion would spread, Bakhtiar ordered the air force to bomb another gigantic depot where 200,000 rifles and machine guns were stored. The air force refused the order. Bakhtiar ordered the army into the streets to put down the rebellion. The army did not move. Tehran was paralyzed, as armed mobs were battling military forces around the city and nation. Yet no military commander emerged to provide orders for the troops!

The joint general staff and the command of the entire Iranian armed forces met to discuss the crisis. Then in a shock to the world, they emerged to declare that the Imperial Armed Forces would remain "impartial" in the crisis! The declaration appeared over the signature of the Iranian Chief of Staff, General Gharabaghi. That decision was imposed with brutal force. Its very issuance meant that the armed forces had withdrawn from the battle and the troops were ordered to pull back into their barracks. Tehran and Iran's other cities were handed over to the mobs of Khomeini worshippers. Resistance to the army's decision was met with summary execution. A group around General Abdul Ali Badri and his associates opposed Gharabaghi's edict and began making plans for a coup against the

Khomeini forces to preserve order — when he and his allies were shot in cold blood by officers following Gharabaghi's command! All across Tehran, dozens of other officers were shot by hit teams under Gharabaghi and General Fardoust's control. Another defector was Air Force commander General Hossein Rabii. Although Rabii had earned a reputation as a hard line loyalist to the Shah, in the crucial hours of February 9-11, he suddenly announced that he was switching sides and "joining the revolution." Reportedly, General Rabii had been promised his own survival and help to leave the country, in exchange for his cooperation in securing the airports and fields for Khomeini. Soon afterwards, Rabii was double-crossed, arrested and machine-gunned to death a few minutes after a kangaroo court trial. In the next 48 hours, up to 350 Iranian officers of the top command were murdered by professional assassin teams. Their names were apparently printed out from a computer at military headquarters, which revealed every man in a command position of logistical control, communications and mobile units. Those who refused to cooperate with the "revolution" were eliminated. Professionals in the military field were amazed at how easily the 350,000-man Iranian armed forces was paralyzed and disintegrated. Repeatedly, in this connection, one name came up: General Robert E. Huyser of the United States Air Force. Then serving as the No. 2 man in the NATO Command in Brussels under Alexander Haig, Huyser was sent to Iran in the beginning of January, a few days before the Guadeloupe meeting at which Carter told the West Germans and French that the United States was dumping the Shah. The visit was scheduled to last only 3 days, but Huyser stayed in Iran until early February, more than one month after his arrival. From January 3rd to February 4th, General Huyser met with the leading generals of the armed forces command every day. The pressure was building in Iran: on January 16th the Shah went to Egypt and then Morocco and in both places the military leadership reportedly called the Shah and begged him for orders to move against Khomeini. The Shah refused to give the orders. (Later, he would say that he was waiting for permission from Washington to confront Khomeini directly, a remark that disgusted many Iranians who took it to mean that the Shah was openly admitting, finally, that he was a puppet of Washington!) General Huyser, in constant contact with Brzezinski, told the generals that they must not move militarily against Khomeini, no matter what might happen. If they did, Huyser said, the U.S. military would disown them, halt all supplies of arms and spare parts and "cut them off at the legs." Huyser foiled not one but several attempted coups d'état. His main function was to assure the generals that, when the moment came and the civilian government was incapable of withstanding the revolutionary forces, then the United States would support a military takeover of Iran. Contented with that assurance many generals simply sat back and waited and when the mob, armed took to the streets, did nothing. "Huyser really worked on them," said a source cited by the *Washington Post*, referring to Iran's command. "He really did a number on them." Said one Iranian general of General Khosrowdad, reportedly one of the coup plotters, "I saw Khosrowdad's face when he came out of one of the briefings. He looked like a private." He was later executed by one of Khomeini's gangs. To some of the generals, Huyser reportedly stated that the United States did not believe that the Shah could return and that the Carter administration was seeking a partnership between the clergy and the military. General Gharabaghi may have encouraged this belief with his advocacy of negotiations with the Khomeini camp. One thing is certain: without General Huyser's mission, Khomeini would not have come to power so effortlessly. The nation of Iran would have faced a bloodbath of extremely serious dimensions, possibly

civil war. In the end, many Iranians and other analysts believe, the most extreme forces in the Khomeini camp would have been defeated and moderates forced to compromise, possibly along the lines of the accord that had already been worked out between Bakhtiar and Bazargan. According to former high-ranking Iranian officers, Khomeini would have been instantly assassinated by the army intelligence division, and his followers disorganized.

That never happened. Instead, of the nineteen to twenty Iranian generals who signed the neutrality declaration of February 9th, at least ten were shot by Khomeini's SAVAMA and the Revolutionary Guard in the weeks after the revolution; several others are still in prison in Iran. Only a few survived: Fardoust, said to be the chief of SAVAMA under Khomeini; Gharabaghi, who until the summer of 1980 played an important role inside Iran with Khomeini's armed forces; Admiral Kamal Habibollahi, fled Iran some months after the revolution but reportedly maintained contact with Khomeini's military from the United States; and General Toufanian, now lives underground in the United States. The rest are dead. General Huyser, reassigned to the Scott Air Force Base in Illinois, where he heads the Military Airlift Command, has not fully explained his mission to anyone. The best assessment of the Khomeini regime was provided by Prime Minister Bakhtiar several days before the mob swept away his authority. "Khomeini is an ignoramus. He is a jealous, negative, destructive man. Khomeini's entourage is a true zoo comprised of shady and dubious people. Half of the people who are out shouting against me are illiterate and instead of going to the mosque they should be going to school. What Khomeini has done in a few weeks has already caused more damage than 25 years of the Shah's regime."

But what Khomeini would do in the next few months would truly stun the world.

To be continued

WHERE DID ALL THE SOLDIERS GO?

In 524 BC, the Persian army of King Cambyses was lost in the western desert of Egypt. The soldiers were on their way to attack the Oasis of Siwa and destroy the oracle at the Temple of Amun. The army stopped at El-Khargeh and was never seen again. Herodotus, a Greek historian, claims they were swallowed in a giant sand storm.

Because it remains a mystery, tour operator Aqua is setting up expeditions to the area in search of clues and artifacts to find some answers. These willing vacationers will be provided with four-wheel drives to comb the sand. Each tour lasts ten to twenty-two days.

WHO WAS BABAK KHORRAMDIN?

He is considered to be one of Iran's greatest heroes following the fall of Iran to Islam. After years of fighting in the invasion of Azerbaijan, he was betrayed by Afshin and was eventually handed over and murdered by Caliph.